

HEADQUARTERS
 1ST BATTALION (AIRBORNE) 8TH CAVALRY
 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
 APO San Francisco, California 96490

AVGIC-GO

30 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

TO: Commanding Officer
 1st Airborne Brigade
 1st Air Cav Division
 ATTN: S-3
 APO US Forces 96490

1. NAME AND TYPE OPERATION:

- a. Name: HENRY CLAY AIRBORNE
 b. Type: Search and Destroy

2. DATE OF OPERATION: 020001 July - 29 July 663. LOCATION: Reference, Maps, Vietnam 1:50,000 Sheets4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 1st Airborne Brigade5. REPORTING OFFICER: Lt Col Levin B. Broughton6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

A 1/8

B 1/8

Bn Control
Pathfinder team

C 1/8

D 1/8

7. TAC Air and ARA were used sparingly for LZ preparation almost exclusively. Air Cavalry was used for first and last light recon of the Bn AO, and for general screening of the AO when weather or situation permitted its use.
8. INTELLIGENCE: As a result of the contacts of the 1st Cav during the month of June in Phu Yen Province as well as intelligence gleaned from captured documents it appeared that a new division or at least a control headquarters had come into being and possible that an operation by the VC extending from Hwy 14 west-southwest was underway.

On the morning of 3 July 1966, 1/8 Cav (-) was airlifted from Tuy Hoa (South) to 3 separate LZ's in the Bn AO. Recon platoon was divided into three six man teams, one team being airlifted into the Bn AO on 1 July. At 1715 hours Recon Team B (hereafter referred to as "Pagan" teams A, B and C) engaged 1 VC with carbine at BQ 735200 with negative results. This was the only contact made within the Bn on 3 July.

On 4 July only 2 sightings were reported. Air Scout team spotted 3 personnel in khaki shirts and dark pants at BQ 735203. Pagan A team was allegedly pursued by an unknown number of VC from their night OP position CQ 762240. Arty was called in; however, no actual contact was made.

Enemy contact was made for the first time on 5 July since the operation began. Co A engaged 3 VC at approx 1550 hrs at BQ 721228 resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC) and believed wounding the other two. 1 field phone, 2 boxes of MG ammo and 2 packs were captured. No weapons were found. Earlier in the day Co C found an old hospital area at 755215, capable of sheltering approx 100 personnel, however area was very old and had not been used for several months.

There was negative contact with the enemy from 5 to 7 July 66. At approx 1015 hrs on 7 July 66 at BQ 675249, 2nd platoon of Co A spotted and killed 1 VC wearing khaki uniform and captured 1 SKS Carbine and 4 hand grenades.

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RBF/13/32)

At approx 1800 hrs on 6 July a CIDG patrol (1/9 Bn perimeter security force) made contact with 2 VC sitting around camp fire at 728207. 1 VC was killed and the other captured as well as a RUBBER type gas mask, 4 grenades, 3-75 mm RR rds, 50 rds 7.62 ammo, approx 10 lbs equipment and uniforms and 2 medical aid kits. Interrogation of the VC revealed he was a member of the 7th Bn, 18th Regt.

The following day, 9 July only one sighting was made which was made by Co A, 8th Ingra of 10 uninhabited huts and old trails leading from huts to the NE at 678207.

On 12 July, after having moved to a new AO to the west, AT Platoon found what was described as a way station at BQ 414514. Area had 10 platforms 3 of same very large all containing fresh vegetables, also found 3 sets of web gear and small amount of cloth. Area appeared to have been used that day. The areas was staked out during the night; however, no contact was made. No other significant sightings were made. The only sighting on 13 July was 1 VC at BQ 413516 at 0930 hrs. The VC was taken under fire with negative results.

On 14 July the Bn moved to Fan Mecca (AQ 947552) and Fan Valhalla (BQ 005597) for security missions. Extensive patrolling was conducted in and around Fan Mecca with negative contact from 14-17 July and 19-27 July 66. Maximum Civil Affairs activities were conducted while at Fan Mecca with five Montagnard villages nearby. Valuable intelligence information and local interpreters/guides were provided by local Montagnard villages to the Bn S2.

9. MISSION: 1/8 Cavalry was to search and destroy in assigned AO's as the 1st Bde Task Force swept from Tuy Hoa RVN to the west towards Cambodia.
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Initially to move the entire 1/8 Cav from Tuy Hoa South Airfield (Anzio) to an AO west up the Song Ba River Valley utilizing 3 LZ's to initiate Co size search and destroy operations in the assigned AO.
11. EXECUTION: Commencing 020001 the Bn began planning for entrance into the assigned AO west of Tuy Hoa. Due to a lack of hard enemy intelligence in the AO the introduced 3 six man recon (Fagan) teams into the Bn AO at BQ 743158, BQ 678198, and BQ 714204 on 1 July. The teams remained until the Bn entered the AO of 3 July. All reported negative contact.

Commencing 030607 July Co's B, D (-) and HHC (-) plus mortar plats of A & C Co's lifted off of the beach EZ at Tuy Hoa South inbound for LZ MARLIN (BQ 735189). Landing was made with negative contact following a TAG Air Strik at 0650. At 0715 Co C (-) lifted from Tuy Hoa to LZ SHARK (BQ 750139) landing at 0750 with negative contact and began a sweep to the west of the LZ finally coiling for the night at BQ 748126. Co A lifted from Tuy Hoa for LZ PIKE (BQ 685174) at 0715 and landed with negative contact at 0740. Co A with the AT Flat attached made a 4 axis advance to an area NW of PIKE coiling for the night at that objective. The only reports of VC the 1st operational day were suspects seen by Recon team operating vicinity of LZ MARLIN. Active H&I programs were initiated by C 2/19 arty in MARLIN along with organic mortars. Negative contact with the enemy was reported.

Commencing 040630 Co B securing LZ MARLIN dispatched plat size patrols in the MARLIN area, reporting negative results. Co A and C continued S&D ops throughout the day generally to the North. Recon platoon moved from LZ MARLIN to occupy a blocking psn for Co C 1st plat linking up with Co C at 1245 hours. Recon closed back to MARLIN at 1725 hrs and 1 sqd was dispatched to OPs at BQ 762249 and BQ 704221. H&I programs continued throughout the night with negative contact reported.

Commencing 050800 hrs Co's A & C continued S&D ops to the North. Co C reported negative contact while Co A made contact with a VC fire team consisti of 3 VC at BQ 718230 at 1550 hrs. One VC KIA (BC) and 2 two VC WIA (EST) resulted from the brief fire fight. Recon plat patrolled vicinity of LZ MARLIN with negative report. The Bn began planning for mvt to an AO farther to the west.

Intelligence secured by the 1/9 Cav in the mountainous area to the North and west of LZ MARLIN indicated VC/NVA activity. The 1st Bde directed a four Bn circolement of the area. Co A reported assuming their blocking psn vicinity 692232 at 0325 hrs after an all night march. Co A/8th Ingra' Bn became OGA to 1/8 Cav at 0800 hrs. Ingra Co was employed as infantry and placed in a blocking position (vic BQ 685205). Co C was extracted by UH1D a/cft and deployed into

AVCIC-00

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

30 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

blocking positions at 1015 hrs via BQ 665168. Recon Plat was attached to Co C at 1015 hrs and along with Co C mortar plat was airlifted from MARLIN to Co C's location. Co B became OCA to the 1/9 Cav and was immediately deployed inside the encircled area at 1329 hrs. Co D secured LZ MARLIN with a Co (-) until CIDG Co was airlifted to that location at 1630 hrs. All Co's were in blocking positions at 1630 hours. H&I programs continued with neg contact reported the remainder of the night.

At 070805 July Co B mortars transferred by air to Co B's location at BQ 657244. Contact was established at 1015 via BQ 675249 when element of the 2nd plat Co A killed (BC) one NVA soldier and captured his weapon. The plan to shift the 1/8 Cav to the south and tighten up its area of responsibility was delayed one day since CIDG forces did not enter the AO and assume Co A 1, sector as planned. The AT Plat was detached from Co A and returned to LZ MARLIN at 1650 hrs to increase the security of that psn. Negative further contact was made.

Commencing 080753 Co A was relieved in sector by CIDG elements and re-employed to a FZ at BQ 665168. At 1255 hrs Co A had assumed new blocking psns in the southern third of the AO. In preparation for the next days offensive Co C moved by air to BQ 678178 closing at 1300 hrs. Patrolling continued by CIDG and AT Platoons via of LZ MARLIN. A CIDG patrol made contact with 2 NV soldiers at 1545 hrs. 1 NVA soldier was killed (BC) and the other captured and evacuated. Plans for offensive opns on 9 July required that Co C attack in sector supported by A/8th Engrs blocking. Co A continued limited probes. Negative further contact was reported. Illumination and H&I programs continued through out the night.

At 0645 hrs 9 July Co C conducted its attack in sector with negative results. Co C coiled for the night in the AO and continued the attack the following day. Two plats of a Co/8th Engrs conducted limited probes and established blocking psn for Co C to sweep against. Co C swept assigned area and returned at 1950 hours with negative contact. Co B was released from OCA 1/12 and became OCA 1st Bde for Ban Blech security, Plans for moving Co B by 1st Bde were tentatively scheduled for the following day.

Upon completion of offensive opns in the AO 1st Bde ordered a standown in place of 1st Bde units prior to moving to a new area of opns. At 1230 hrs 10 July Co A began an air extraction from BQ 6617 to the waterfall near LZ MARLIN. Co C began an air mvt at 1335 hrs to the same area. Recon remained OCA to Co C for the move. Co D(-) and Hq 1/8 remained at LZ MARLIN. 1/8th Engrs was extracted back to 1st Bde CP area and was released from OCA 1/8. The Bn (-) was thus coiled vic LZ MARLIN. Plans for opns in the next AO continued. An active H&I was fired throughout the night and negative contact was reported.

Commencing 110805 A Co began the 1st lift of the Bn (-) to Psn NIRVANA. BQ 504595. Order of move was Co A, Co C, Bn CP and Co D. The move was completed by 1135 hrs. CIDG plats securing LZ MARLIN were detached and airlifted back to Psn BOOT, location of 1st Bde TAC CP. D Day for the opns in the new AO was scheduled for 12 July 66. Co B continued as security force for Ban Blech under 1st Bde. On D Day Co A was to air assault into LZ's FUDGE and OREO with Co C, D and the CP landing at LZ NEWTON. Bn Recon plat was to assault into LZ GREAM. No H&I's were fired due to a heavy populated area and negative contact was made while at Psn NIRVANA.

At 120930 hrs a tube arty prep on LZ's OREO and FUDGE preceded Co A's assaults into that area. At 1007 Co A's 1st and 2nd plats assaulted into LZ OREO (BQ 485530) with neg contact. Following Co A's move Co C followed by Co D and the CP group assaulted into LZ NEWTON (BQ 415505). This assault was preceded by a TAC air strike beginning 0930 hrs. The Recon plat then air assaulted into LZ GREAM (BQ 378544) with neg contact. This landing was also preceded by a TAC air strike beginning at 1000 hrs. Recon closed the Bn in the new AO by 1125 hrs. Co C dispatched plat size patrols to the NE, E, and SE, reporting trails and a possible way station at BQ 428489. Co C remained in the AO with neg contact. Co A moved to the W & SW with 1st and 2nd plats on separate routes. Co A CP remained near LZ FUDGE. The Co (-) conducted search and destroy opns from there with negative contact.

The Recon plat was hindered by virgin terrain and their planned route had to be modified. Patrolling continued with negative contact. C Btry 2/1, closed LZ NEWTON and fired an active H&I program throughout the night. The one report of enemy action resulted from suspected firing on a CH-47 East of LZ NEWTON. AT plat (-) was dispatched and found a large way station via BQ 408514. The patrol was reinforced prior to dark and established an ambush for the night. No contact was made.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

Commencing 130700 Co C, Recon platoon, and Co A continued S&D with Co C reporting completion of operations in its AO by 1200 hrs. The Bn CO ordered Co C to coil and prepare for extraction. At 1320 hrs Co A began coiling via LZ FUDGE and the Bn Recon platoon was extracted back to LZ NEWTON. The 1/8 (-) was alerted to move to 1st MECCA (AQ 947552) to secure elements of the 227th AHB. Co C was chosen to make the assault beginning at 0700 hrs the following day. An active H&I program was fired in LZ NEWTON that night with neg contact reported.

Beginning 140710 Co C, Co D (-) and a portion of the Bn CP left vic of LZ NEWTON for position MECCA; but due to inclement weather hindering visual observance of the LZ, the assault force landed at Ban Blech at BQ 005597 (Ban VALHALLA). At 0845 hrs the fog lifted and the assault force was air lifted at 0855 hrs with neg contact. The remainder of the Bn (-) closed from LZ NEWTON at 1145 hrs. Co B, at Ban Blech, returned to OCA 1/8; but continued as the security force around VALHALLA. One tank Co (Co C 1/69 Armor) became OCA 1/8 Cav. Co A dispatched all rifle platoon to ambush sites within 1500 meters radius of MECCA. No contact was made. Co C was designated as 1st Bde 30 min reaction force. The 3rd platoon Co C 1/69 arrived 2015 hrs at MECCA for aid in the defense of the soft laager area. No H&I's were fired because of the populated area. No contact was reported.

Commencing 150630 hrs Co B sent a platoon to provide security for engineers working on a blown bridge bypass (AQ 613601). Co A returned to MECCA from ambush locations and assumed Bde 30 min reaction force. Co C returned to the security mission for MECCA. The Recon platoon departed MECCA at 0904 to search and destroy west of MECCA, returning at 1610 with negative results. At 1533 Co A became OCA to 1/9 and departed MECCA by air. 3rd platoon Co C 1/69 departed MECCA for VALHALLA to join its parent unit for a future opn. Co B continued to secure VALHALLA. Co C and Co D conducted the same mission at MECCA. No contact was reported.

Commencing 160800 Co C dispatched local anti-mortar patrols in the vic of MECCA. Co C closed at 1305 hrs with one report of finding a 30 cal ammo box in the AO. Planning for a future opn was in effect throughout the day. Neg enemy contact by any 1/8 element was reported.

Beginning 170720 July Co C dispatched three security patrols in the area Co D dispatched two such patrols. 1/8 received OCA of 1 platoon of engr from A/8th Engr to secure on arty btry at BQ 128550, and 1 Co of CIDG that began screening opn between VALHALLA and MECCA. All patrols returned at 1700 hrs with neg contact reported. H&I programs were increased and no enemy contact was reported. Co A remained OCA to 1/9 Cav.

On 18 July the units at MECCA continued to conduct security patrols. Co B at VALHALLA dispatched a platoon to a blown bridge AQ 9744601. The only incident of the period was AT sqd receiving auto wpns fire while air assaulting into the LZ at AQ 979544. Once on the ground no more fire was received and there were no further reports of contact in the AO. H&I's were fired and planning for future opns were conducted.

Beginning 190030 Co B at Ban VALHALLA reported an electrical device spotting 18-25 persons moving outside their area. Mortars were fired, however no evidence of an enemy force was found. At 0800 hrs Co's C and D began squad size patrolling near MECCA. Patrols closed at 1225 hrs with neg contact reports. H&I programs continued with neg contact throughout the night.

At 200400 radar teams at VALHALLA again reported movement outside of VALHALLA. Tank was used to fire at the unseen target with no known results. At 0815 hrs Co C and D began patrolling around MECCA area with no contact. CIDG continued security opns to the North of MECCA. Co C 1/69 armor became OCA again to 1/8 at VALHALLA for security of that area. Co A remained OCA to 1/9. Planning for opn in area GREEN continued. Active H&I's continued.

On 21 July the area GREEN opn was cancelled. Patrolling in area MECCA continued. Tank infantry team from Co B 1/8 and C 1/69 departed VALHALLA to the NE on a S&D mission. Negative contact reported. Co A became OCA to 1/12 Cav. Active H&I with both arty and mortars continued in the AO with neg contact reported.

Commencing on 0700 the 22nd of July Co C 1/69 armor conducted mechanized

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

patrolling around MECCA returning to VALHALLA that afternoon. Co C utilized 3 sqd size patrols around MECCA. CIDG continued screening south of MECCA. A/8 Engrs became OCA to 1/8 at VALHALLA for aid in security of their location. H&I's continued during the hrs of darkness with neg contact reported in the AO.

On 23 July intelligence reports of an NVA soldier at AQ 955484 (village) caused the 1/8 to dispatch a plat and sqd from Co C to attempt capture. Search of the village failed to locate the suspect and the plat closed MECCA with neg contact reported. Three long range OPs were posted S,W, and E of MECCA all reporting neg contact. Two Pagan Teams were introduced into the local AO around MECCA.

Commencing 240900 Co C dispatched three patrols from MECCA closing at 1200 with neg reports. Pagan Teams consisting of 6 and 7 man long range patrols from Co D dispatched on the 23rd returned with neg contact reported. Shortly after 1600 hrs Co B sent 1 plat by air to secure a downed acft at AQ 055605. This plat closed at 1800 hrs having accomplished its mission. Negative contact reported.

It was planned to move Co A to MECCA to secure that location on the 25th, however movement plans were cancelled due to weather conditions. Plat of Co A remained OCA to 1/9. Co C continued to patrol MECCA with neg contact

Beginning 260900 July Co A plat OCA to 1/9 returned to Co A control. Co C patrolled area MECCA with neg results. H&I's fired throughout the night with no contact.

Commencing 270800 Co C & D conducted patrols in the vic of MECCA. At 1550 hrs Co's C & D with the Bn CP closed VALHALLA from MECCA in preparation for the next days move to Camp Radcliffe. Negative contact was reported in the AO.

Commencing 280835 1/8 ground convoy passed SF and began the move to An Khe. At 1105 hrs 1st G-130 sortie lifted Psn VALHALLA for An Khe. The Bn's road and air move closed An Khe prior to darkness at approx 1800 hrs closing the Bn (-). Co B remained OCA to 1st Bde at Ban Blech (VALHALLA) returning to An Khe by convoy 30 July 66.

12. RESULTS:

- a. Enemy: VC KIA (BG) - 3, VCC - 1, Wpns (Ind) - 1, SA Ammo - 350 rds grenades - 14, 75 mm RL rds - 3, Uniforms & Equipment - 40 lbs, Russian Gas Mask - 1 and Chicom Fld Phone - 1.
- b. Friendly: KIA - 0, WIA - 12, MIA - 0
- c. US Equipment destroyed during operation: None.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

- a. In general logistical and service support were excellent.
- b. The long turn around time of the resupply helicopters from Tuy Hoa while the units were around LZ MARLIN caused an almost continuous usage. The number of hrs the log helicopters must fly is, of course, directly proportional to the tactical deployment; ie the distance from bn trains to the companies.
- c. Communications were extended to a maximum while the forward CP was at LZ NEWTON. At this time the Bn trains were moved to VALHALLA and for a period of approx 8 hrs there was no direct commo admin/log net between the forward CP and Bn trains.
- d. The move of the Bn trains from Tuy Hoa to VALHALLA was improperly supervised by higher headquarters.
- e. The short distance between VALHALLA and MECCA made resupply and feeding by helicopters quite easy. Initially we would use the two log ships from 061 to 0830 and from 1630 to 1800, a total of 3 3/4 hrs for resupply and feeding. Later as the daily fog bank clung to MECCA the use of ships depended on the weather conditions. Breakfast was served whenever it came, as late as 1130. and supper was prepared for pick up as early as 1530.

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RGS/J3/32)

- f. The weather became so sporadic that a convoy with breakfast and resupply was dispatched from VALHALLA on three successive mornings. The road condition prevented the convoy from arriving as early as it should have.
- g. Barrier materials were requested by the company defending MECCA and these requests were forwarded to 1st FSE. Since it had none on hand they sent back to An Khe. At the same time the Bn S-4 section at An Khe was contacted. By personal arrangement with the 228th the 1/8 Bn S4 was able to get 5000 sand bags and 56 rolls of concertina directly from An Khe to MECC two days prior to the arrival of that requested by 1st FSE.

14. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

a. General:

(1) This operation was mounted in an area where local intelligence agencies (23rd ARVN Div Ad. Gp., Darlac sector, Buon Ho sub sector, Buon Brien SF Camp) had indicated little VC activity. It appeared that there was little more than an intuitive feeling that the VC might be there. In terms of the combat power committed, the results were disappointing.

(2) In connection with the extremely limited VC contact experienced, I believe that it was reasonably apparent by 20 July that we had hit a "dry hole".

(3) This battalion was away from its base camp for a period of 49 days, resulting in equipment "wear and tear" becoming apparent after approx one month. During this period, the men received only a one day stand down (2 July). Despite the length of the period and the brevity of the stand-down, I do not believe that they were exhausted or sun-down, due primarily to the light enemy contact experienced during the latter part of the period (OPERATION HENRY CLAY AIRBORNE).

b. Weather: Inadequate attention was given to the impact of weather on operations. The limiting weather conditions experienced were not unseasonable being those normally to be expected in the Western plateau area during the season of the Southwest monsoon.

c. Perimeter Security: This headquarters experienced difficulty in accomplishing its mission of coordinating the perimeter security of the VALHALLA area forward base camp because of the limited resources available for this purpose especially in consideration of other assigned missions and because of its incomplete awareness of the daily employment and utilization of the several combat and combat support units operating under Brigade control and providing portions of the security.

d. Communication:

(1) The PRC-25 has been proven to be an impractical radio for long range patrolling because of the weight of the batteries required to sustain operation. Each LRE team has also been shown to require both an AM and FM capability.

(2) Communications security (Comsec) is still a weak point to be noted on all radio nets.

e. Indigenous Programs:

(1) PSYWAR activities were mostly ineffective during the operation since the loudspeaker and leaflet programs were in the Vietnamese language and not in the local Montagnard dialects peculiar to the operating area.

(2) Liaison within Montagnard villages, CIDG, SF, Project Delta, and sub-sector camps for intelligence, guides, and interpreters proved most successful for this battalion. The battalion procured and paid for its own Vietnamese and Montagnard guides and interpreters who were made available to units down to and including platoon level during the last several weeks of the operation.

(3) The provision of local force personnel familiar with language and terrain in the operating area during the early stages of the operation greatly assisted in the interrogation of VCC/VCS and in guiding patrols.

f. Miscellaneous:

(1) The opportunity to work with the Cavalry squadron and a tank company provided valuable training for this battalion.

(2) Reaction time was inadequate in the case of several operations involving Co A, 1/8. In this regard, no problems resulted because of a lack of enemy contact. Had the enemy actively opposed several of that company's air assaults, serious casualties very easily

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)
could have been sustained because of a lack of LZ preparation.

- (3) The provision of aerial surveillance by 1st Brigade in support of this battalion was excellent.
- (4) The failure of higher headquarters to notify this unit of map coverages required for proposed or pending operations caused this headquarters to "second guess" and/or to overstock coverage of very large areas in order to meet the almost ever-changing needs.

15. COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS:


- a. When it becomes reasonably apparent that an operation has hit a "dry hole", it should be rapidly terminated or the operation should be shifted to another area.
- b. The limitations to operations imposed by predictably poor weather conditions should receive a greater degree of attention when planning future missions.
- c. The responsibility for forward base camp security should be retained by Brigade. As the senior headquarters, it is in the best position to coordinate perimeter security and has the means to do so. The Brigade Deputy Commander is the logical officer to handle this requirement.
- d. Forces deployed in a perimeter security role should undergo a "WILDCAT" alert at least every 48 hours on a schedule to include both day and night alert times.
- e. The HR-1B, AM, Single Side Band, fixed crystal radio should be employed in long range patrol team operations. It weighs four (4) pounds and operates on eight (8) BA 30's.
- f. Continued command emphasis should continue to be given to a program of communications security.
- g. PSYWAR activities should be tailored to the area of operations in terms of effectiveness with regard to indigenous personnel.
- h. Liaison at battalion level with friendly local intelligence sources should be continued and encouraged as a means of providing timely information, guides and interpreters.
- i. Operations should be planned with a view to consistently allow proper planning and reaction time for subordinate units.
- j. Subordinate units should be informed of possible and pending general operating areas on a continuing basis in order that the optimum map stockage may be maintained in the field.

2 Incls:


1. Operations Sketches
2. Trails Overlay

for *Burt A Lesh Capt 1st*
LEVIN B. DROUGHTON
Lt Col, Infantry
Commanding

3 July 66




4 July 66



OZ PIKE

OZ LZ Shark

5 July 66




OZ PIKE


OZ Shark

Incl 1


6 July 66




7 July 66




8 July 66




9 July 66




10 July 66




11 July 66




12 July 66




13 July 66




14 July 66




15 July 66




16 July 66




17 July 66




18 July 66




19 July 66




20 Jul 66




21 July 66




22 July 66 Co A 1/8




23 Jul 66




24 July 66




25 July 66




26 July 66




27 July 66




28 July 66



30 July 66



Trails O/L
OPEN HENRY CLAY (ABN)
Hq 1/8 Cav
Maps 1:50,000 Sheet 6749 I



72
BQ + 27


78
18 + BQ

All trails 2 to 4 feet wide

Small 2

TRAILS OVERLAY
1st Bn (Abn) 8th Cav
OF HENRY CLAY (ABN)
1:50,000
Sheet 6750 III

44
BQ + 53



50 + 39
BQ

1. All E-W trails recently used and well defined
2. Trails N-S are defined, but show no recent use

l-12